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Social dialogue under the shadow of the EU: the failure of Hollande’s social conferences 
 
Abstract 
 
Annual tripartite social conferences were introduced in France in 2012, pre-empting EU 
ambitions to reinvigorate the social dialogue at EU and national levels. Despite some 
successes, they did not live up to their ambitions to elicit consensus and give trade unions a 
voice in policymaking due to: opposition to, and protest against, government policy from 
some unions; the avoidance of discussion on contentious legislation; and the constraints of 
the Country Specific Recommendations arising out of the European Semester. The French 
experience of social dialogue suggests that the chances of the EU achieving its ambition of 
building consensus over economic and social reform through reinvigorating the social 
dialogue appear slim.  
 
Key words: François Hollande. social conferences, social dialogue, trade unions, European 
Semester, Country Specific Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
 
The social dialogue is the involvement of the social partners – trade unions and representative 
employer organisations – in the design and implementation of public policies, including 
through collective bargaining and bipartite and tripartite structures through which the state 
consults the major socio-economic forces – usually trade unions and employer organisations 
of the country (Ishikawa 2003: 3). The aim of such involvement is to elicit consensus over 
the broad direction of economic and social policy. Against a background of rising 
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Euroscepticism, the European Union (EU) has attempted to reinvigorate the social dialogue, 
including at the national level, as a means of reinforcing the legitimacy of the EU (European 
Commission 2015; Natali et al. 2015: 25 - 26). France could be seen as pre-empting such 
steps when annual consultative tripartite ‘social conferences’ were introduced in 2012 by the 
newly-elected President, François Hollande. Using France as a case study, this article will 
therefore examine whether the social dialogue, and particularly the involvement of trade 
unions in policymaking, can bring about greater consensus over social and economic policies, 
through an examination of policy innovation in the domain of the social dialogue in France.  
 
This is an important question as the decline of trade unions, and with them of social 
democratic movements, is at least part of the explanation for the rise of populist parties that 
are seen as a threat to hitherto stable democracies, particularly in the EU (see for example 
Royo 2017). This decline may also explain why there has been little written recently on social 
dialogue at the national level in European countries, and particularly in France. Indeed, the 
focus has generally been on conflict and trade union decline in France and not on institutions 
designed to increase trade union voice and reduce levels of conflict (for a recent example see 
Lallement & Rey 2015). This study can therefore increase our understanding of French 
industrial relations and social dialogue in particular, but may also provide lessons for other 
countries facing similar challenges of gaining consensus around social and economic change, 
particularly where the traditional representative voice of wage-earners – the trade union 
movement – is weak.  In sum, a key contribution of this research is to provide an assessment 
of the extent to which the EU’s ambitions for a reinvigoration of social dialogue can 
legitimise policy through social consensus under conditions of union weakness and tight 
external economic constraints – in this case emanating from the EU - and what the results of 
this may be through the examination of an attempt to do precisely this in France..  
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To do this, we shall firstly examine the importance of the social dialogue as a tool for 
legitimising policy output in the EU. We then set out the theoretical framework for this study. 
The notion of spillover, in both policy and institutional terms, will be examined to see how it 
can shape the social dialogue at national level, before the French case is elaborated upon. The 
following section then sets out the methodology used, before the results of the research are 
reported. Conclusions are then drawn in the final section. 
 
Social dialogue and the legitimation of policy 
 
Since the 1970s, under the pressures of changing work patterns, welfare strain and economic 
globalisation, advanced liberal democracies have faced the question of how to cope with 
pressures for greater economic competitiveness while ensuring social justice and 
inclusiveness. In the post-war era, in many countries, trade unions acted as the mediator of 
workers’ interests to ensure trade-offs were not detrimental to workers’ interests, sometimes 
through corporatist institutions and practices (Schmitter 1979). Since the 1970s, however, 
such institutions have been weakened, and trade unions have faced a declining strength as 
neo-liberal economic paradigms have risen to ascendency. The result has been the emergence 
of the ‘left behind’ (Ford & Goodwin 2014) who have increasingly turned to far right 
nationalist parties to represent their interests. The culmination of such trends, to date, was the 
rejection of the current economic and political status quo expressed in the 23 June 2016 UK 
referendum on EU membership. Such tensions are not confined to the UK, however, as far 
right and left parties have gained traction across the EU, particularly in the wake of the 
financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 (Hix & Marsh 2011; Rooduijn, 2015). In 
France, the Front National candidate, Marine Le Pen advanced to the second round of the 
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2017 presidential elections on a nationalist, anti-EU platform. Finding a way to manage the 
equity versus efficiency conundrum in a way that ensures that the voice of the ‘left behind’ is 
heard and taken into account is therefore of primordial importance, not only to national 
polities, but also to the EU as a whole.  
 
As Natali (2015; 256 - 60) argues, this poses a challenge at both EU and national levels, as 
reforms are more likely to be seen as legitimate by the social partners, and those they 
represent, if they are jointly elaborated, and seen to be so, than if they are the result of 
government initiative alone. For the European Commission, the equity versus efficiency 
tension can be resolved through a social market economy, and social dialogue is an essential 
prerequisite to the success of this.  Since November 2014, when Jean-Claude Junker took up 
the presidency, the European Commission has emphasized the need for a stronger social 
dimension to the EU, and has sought to strengthen the social dialogue, particularly the 
involvement of the social partners in the European Semester (European Commission 2015; 
Natali et al. 2015; 25 - 26).  
Hence the European Commission’s call for national governments to ‘closely involve national 
parliaments and social partners in the design and implementation of relevant reforms and 
policies’ (Caspar et al. 2016; 195). Indeed, the national level is crucial for social dialogue as 
the actual outcomes of the process are seen at this level, given that social and labour market 
policies are still under the control of national governments, and patterns of social justice and 
employment are most keenly felt in the national context. However, for EU member states, 
policy options elaborated through the social dialogue are subject to the EU-level constraints 
due to the nature of economic integration in the EU. It is to such constraints that we now turn. 
 
Social Dialogue and EU constraints 
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Indeed, developments at the national level in the social dialogue cannot be seen in isolation 
from developments at the EU level. Neofunctionalist theories of European integration 
(Falkner 1998; Haas 1958) essentially see the development of the social dialogue at this level 
as a result of spillover from economic integration, as the labour market and social 
implications of centrally-determined economic policy need to be taken into account. 
Likewise, multi-level governance theory also sees an increasing Europeanization of industrial 
relations due to the development of symbiotic relationships between different levels of 
governance as actors react to economic integration (Marginson & Sisson 2004). In other 
words, those areas of policymaking formally under the aegis of member state governments, 
such as social and labour market policy are increasingly Europeanized as a result of economic 
integration within a multi-level governance framework. 
 
On the other hand, intergovernmentalists argue that EU influence over social policy remains 
limited, precisely because of member state competence in this area (Talini 2014; 191; Prosser 
2016). Part of the explanation here is the historical focus on ‘negative’ integration aimed at 
dismantling barriers to market integration rather than ‘positive’ integration aimed at market-
correcting social policy (Scharpf 2010). This, analysis, however, is based upon the 
assumption that spillover requires legal competencies to be transferred from one political 
actor (the member state) to another (the EU) to take effect. However, as Lukes (1974) agued, 
power is exercised not only through legal competence, but also through the capacity to set 
agendas. Thus, spillover can occur through policy framing rather than competence in a multi-
level governance system so that one level of government can influence and shape the policies 
of a lower level without having formal competence for that policy area. In this case, the 
notion of spillover can be broadened to encompass not only de jure spillover but also 
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normative spillover in that policy choices can be framed at one level in a multi-level 
governance system to constrain the potential range of policy choice at another level.  
 
Such processes of normative spillover can be seen in reaction to the 2008-9 financial crisis 
and the Eurozone crisis from 2010 onwards. The EU has strengthened and centralised its 
economic governance capacity through the ‘six pack’, Euro Plus Pact and Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, otherwise known as the Fiscal Compact (Crespy & Menz 
2015). This package of measures reinforced the excessive deficit procedure, with the 
potential of financial penalties for infringement and, with the Fiscal Compact, the 
requirement for balanced budgets. At the same time, the European Semester increased the 
monitoring capacity of the European Commission by requiring member states to submit 
annual National Reform Programmes (NRPs) setting out their policy orientations. These are 
scrutinised by the Commission and Council who then draw up Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) for member state governments. These cover, not only economic 
policy, but also social and labour market policies, and are aimed at reinforcing national 
competitiveness and fiscal rectitude. While CSRs cannot force member state governments to 
adopt the recommended social and labour market policies, not to do so while not meeting 
debt and deficit reduction targets could potentially invite financial penalties. 
 
Given that social partner input into the NRPs is expected in an attempt to reinvigorate the 
social dialogue and achieve consensus around reform packages, processes of spillover can be 
observed. Firstly, horizontally, the European Semester has enabled EU scrutiny of not only 
economic but also social policy, and for recommendations to be made to national 
governments on these. Secondly, vertically, processes of social dialogue at the national level 
are part of the exercise. This gives rise to the question of whether this process provides a 
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constraint on the national social dialogue with the result that unions are effectively sidelined 
as argued by Hyman (2015). Or, as argued by the Commission, does this allow for the greater 
involvement of social partners in policymaking, resulting in greater legitimacy for policies 
aimed at achieving socially sustainable economic competitiveness? 
 
For some commentators, the ‘socialisation’ of the European Semester and the greater 
involvement of social policy actors in the process have provided unions with the potential to 
‘politically make their voices heard (…) and to influence its outcomes’ (Zeitlin & Vanhercke 
2015; 91 – 92). For others, however, this is mere ‘window dressing’ (Clauwaert 2015; 17). 
Indeed, for Hyman (2015; 97 -103), the European Semester shifts power away from the 
national level, to EU level expert groups, and weakens social dialogue, particularly at 
national level. In a context where views are polarised and unions weak, social dialogue 
becomes a form of ‘crisis corporatism’ (ibid.) wherein unions are sidelined and have, in order 
to retain any pretence of national presence, to acquiesce to socially regressive, 
competitiveness-focused economic and social policies. 
 
Certainly, it could be argued that this spillover is the result of socialisation, and not the 
exercise of agenda-setting power. However, if the social dialogue is to play the role of an 
institution for socialisation, it would need to also shape the policy orientations of the social 
partners, including trade unions. In the absence of this, a more likely explanation is that the 
threat of hard sanctions arising from the excessive deficit procedure has enabled vertical 
spillover as far as ploicymaking is concerned while not socialising all policy actors into the 
process. If this were the case, the result, rather than consensus and the legitimation of policy- 
making, could be ‘conflict when (…) two differing belief systems, or elements of a political 
system with differing cognitive frameworks, clash over the interpretation of an issue and the 
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consequent action required’ (Parsons 2013b). With part of the union movement marked by a 
history of radicalism, the French case is one that can elucidate such processes. 
 
The French Case 
 
France can be seen as a deviant case where trade unions are ideologically divided and have 
suffered the most serious decline amongst all OECD countries. Indeed, France now has the 
lowest unionisation rate of any OECD country at less than 8% (Parsons 2103a). Such 
weakness is often seen as fuelling radicalism and a reliance upon mobilisation capacity rather 
than negotiation (Lindvall 2011; Shorter & Tilly 1979). On the other hand, while unions may 
be weak, the institutional architecture of industrial relations appears very comprehensive and 
robust, with rights to union representation, consultation and bargaining at national, sectoral 
and company levels enshrined in law (Parsons 2005; 113-52). At national level, the 2007 Law 
on Social Democracy gives the social partners the possibility of concluding collective 
agreements on any matter of social policy in advance of government legislation. This law can 
be seen as downloaded from EU processes of the social dialogue as it replicates provisions 
that first appeared in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty for the European-level social partners to 
conclude an agreement over social policy issues in advance of, and in lieu of, legislation on 
the issue. Even where bargaining is refused by the social partners, they have, by law, to be 
consulted on any proposed social legislation. To engage in national collective bargaining, the 
2008 Law on Trade Union Representativeness stipulated that unions must have at least eight 
per cent of the votes cast in professional elections. In 2013, five organisations achieved this 
and were therefore deemed to be nationally representative, with the so-called reformist 
unions – the CFDT, CFTC and CFE-CGC – having a 51%-49% majority over the so-called 
radical unions, the CGT and FO1 (Ministère du travail 2013). Unions not achieving this 
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threshold were, on the radical side, the FSU and Solidaires, and on the reformist side, UNSA. 
Whether they achieved the threshold or not, all these unions were invited by Hollande to 
participate in the ‘social conferences’. 
 
In his 2012 presidential election campaign, François Hollande appealed to trade unions by 
promising them a greater say over policymaking, and, in line with this established annual 
tripartite social conferences to enable this (Parsons 2015). In this sense, the social 
conferences can be seen as a policy innovation designed to overcome some of the 
dysfunctionalities of the French system of social relations. A numerically weak, politicised 
and fragmented trade union movement, meant that reform was often contested on the streets 
as radical unions such as the CGT, FO and Solidaires organised protest against government 
policy, claiming it was the only way to get their voices heard. Although, historically, the 
government has been able to deal with more reformist unions such as the CFDT, CFTC, 
CFE-CGC and UNSA, the result is that reform was likely to spark conflict – as in 2010 when 
unions were united in their opposition to President Sarkozy’s pension reforms. For Hollande, 
then, the challenge was to reduce conflict through a discussion of policy with all labour 
market actors in order that the effects of economic crisis and high unemployment could be 
addressed through policies elaborated in an atmosphere of consensus. Consultation with 
labour market actors did previously take place, of course, but the social conferences were 
seen as a means of achieving this through bringing all the actors together in one place for 
more transparent discussion. 
 
From 2012 to 2014 social conferences took place over two days, although in 2015 this was 
reduced to one day (19 October), bringing together state, employer and trade union actors. As 
announced in a government report on the inaugural conference in 2012 (République 
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Française 2013: 2), the social conferences were designed as a forum to discuss the general 
orientations of policy. For the conferences, the government produced a briefing document 
setting out the progress made since the previous conference and themes for discussion. In the 
four to six weeks preceding the conference, these themes were the subject of discussion in a 
series of bilateral meetings between unions, employer organisations and the Ministry of 
Labour. Technical background reports and expert analyses to support discussion for each 
theme of the conference were also produced. Discussion then served as the basis for future 
action, including collective bargaining and legislation where appropriate, based on a post-
conference roadmap or work agenda (the feuille de route sociale). Where national collective 
agreements were signed, these were often transposed into law.  In what was presented as 
Hollande’s ‘method’, a sequence of reasoned, evidence-based deliberation followed by 
negotiation, agreement and legislation would ensure consensus and cooperation over the 
design and implementation of social and labour market policies, reducing conflict around 
differing social and economic interests. This process can be seen to mirror EU level processes 
whereby European-level employer organisations (BusinessEurope and the CEEP) and trade 
unions (the ETUC) are consulted on all social legislation and can sign collective agreements 
in lieu of legislation in certain areas. 
 
In replicating EU institutions and processes at the national level, through a government 
openly declaring its wish to give unions a voice in policymaking, France therefore appeared 
to be ideally placed to implement the EU’s declared ambition to reinvigorate social dialogue 
for more consensual ploicymaking and, indeed, on the surface seemed to be doing so. 
According to Lindvall (2011; 299) this should improve trust relations around macro-
economic management with the result that ‘there would probably be fewer protests if the 
social groups that trade unions and other interest organisations represent had more effective 
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representation within political institutions’. Indeed, distrust is often seen as a characteristic 
feature of French industrial relations institutions due to employer anti-unionism, union 
fragmentation – and inter-union rivalry – and a state which sees itself as the incarnation of the 
‘general will’ of the people and which therefore refuses to negotiate with intermediary bodies 
(Parsons 2013a). Hollande’s social conferences could be seen as an attempt to overcome such 
a situation, which renders reform problematic for governments as likely to spark protest 
movements, through institutional innovation. 
However, according to Natali and Rhodes (2004: 2) unions are too weak and divided to 
engage in national-level policy concertation, with the result that the state engages in ‘pre-
emptive trade-offs’ to avoid protest against reform (Natali and Rhodes 2004: 8-10). In this, 
the state can play unions off against each other to achieve its preferred outcomes (Parsons 
2013a; 186-7). As well as these structural and institutional variables, Parsons (2002) has 
shown that ideational variables are important in explaining a lack of policy concertation in 
France. Unions reject corporatist structures as undermining their autonomy from the state and 
hence capacity to defend wage-earner interests, while governing parties of both left and right 
jealously guard the notion that the state governs in the general interest and cannot therefore 
allow policymaking to be subject to the will of vested interests represented by intermediary 
groups, including unions. Again, Hollande’s social conferences suggest an institutional 
innovation designed to overcome such entrenched attitudes.  
On the other hand, it could be asked what motive the state has for participating in social 
dialogue institutions with weak and divided unions when it faces external economic 
constraints and can exert its will through other channels such as the legislative process. Does 
this mean that institutions such as the social conferences are not about ‘genuine’ social 
dialogue in the sense of a search for consensus over policy, but rather a means of legitimising 
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policy decisions taken elsewhere? If this is the case, such institutions will not overcome the 
trust problem in French industrial relations and will not lead to a reduction in conflict. Thus, 
while the French case may be considered ‘deviant’ in that unions are divided and often 
radical, as a worst case scenario, it also provides an excellent test case for the propensity of 
social dialogue to overcome division and to bring about social consensus over the future 
direction of policy and reform. 
 
It should be noted that the social conferences are only consultative, and are not the only 
forum for social dialogue in France. As well as engaging in collective bargaining, the social 
partners have informal meetings with ministers and discuss specific subjects in various issue-
specific formal and informal fora2. They must also be consulted on social and labour market 
bills going through parliament in the Economic, Social and Environmental Committee 
(CESE), and are consulted on the uploading and downloading of policies to the EU through 
the Social Dialogue Committee for European and International Questions (CDSEI). The 
latter, however, only meets for half a day per year and is largely concerned with responding 
to European initiatives or uploading issues discussed elsewhere, while the former only deal 
with specific issues, not overall reform programmes. On the other hand, social conferences 
normally took place over two days, dealing with multiple aspects of social and labour market 
reform to address issues of social justice and competitiveness under thematic headings in the 
glare of the media spotlight. This, and their centrality to Hollande’s project of renewing 
social democracy through increasing the involvement of the trade unions in policymaking, 
means that they are the centre of attention in the research reported here. 
 
Methodology 
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The case study was approached through the collation and content analysis of primary 
documentation and through interviews with key informants. 
 
Official reports from social conferences and trade union reports on all social conferences 
were examined. In addition, Ministry of Labour annual reports on collective bargaining since 
2012 – which also deal with the themes of the social conferences – were analysed. These 
reports deal with the main themes and work agendas of the social conferences, with collective 
bargaining, including areas of failed negotiation, as well as with social legislation and strike 
movements. Press reports on the same topics provided further evidence of the success or 
failure of social conferences to promote consensus around economic and social policies.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with high-ranking key officials from the 
social partners who had represented their organisation in the social conferences - CFDT, 
CGT, FO, UNSA, FSU, Solidaires, CFTC, CFE-CGC for the unions, and MEDEF and U2P 
for the employers. As far as state actors are concerned, a senior policy advisor and a senior 
politician involved in the social conferences were also interviewed. The interviews took place 
during a three-week period in June-July 2017. The only inter-sectoral organisation that did 
not respond positively to requests for interviews was the CPME, which represents small and 
medium-sized companies in France. With one exception, then, the views of all the major 
participants in the social conferences were examined through interviews. Using these 
interviews and the documentary evidence, we now set out the major findings of the case 
study research. 
 
Social conferences in France  
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Policy Outcomes 
 
The French government reports that the broad themes of the social conferences gave rise to a 
volume of agreements and state action (Table 1). This is particularly true of employment and 
training: state services have been reorganised and local and regional trials implemented 
within the framework of the EU-funded ‘Youth Guarantee’; the ‘Occupational Personal 
Account’ (CPA) was introduced to improve the portability of employment-related and 
training rights; extra funding was found for apprenticeships; and gender equality legislation 
reinforced. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
In the area of future employment, investment and productivity, the National Industrial 
Council was reformed to coordinate the modernisation of industry and plan for future 
manpower and training needs arising from technological change. In other areas, as Table 1 
shows, pensions have been reformed, with the aim of improving their financial stability, 
while reforms in the public sector have aimed to improve working life for employees and to 
streamline bureaucratic procedures for end users, both individuals and companies. The social 
Europe/social dialogue theme gave rise to the adoption of the revised Posted Workers 
Directive as well as to calls for further reform to avoid social dumping being presented to the 
European Commission;  and to reforms of company-level employee representation, 
particularly in small and medium-sized companies, through the Rebsamen Law of 2015. 
 
While this suggests that the social conferences generated a great deal of outputs, it tells us 
little about whether trade union views were taken into account during discussions, or 
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whether, as argued by Lindvall (2011), this involvement of unions in the decision-making 
process increased trust between them and governing elites or whether it brought about 
consensus over reforms. These factors being dependent upon perceptions of the process and 
outcomes of social dialogue, we now turn to an examination of participant views. 
 
Participant Views 
 
We do not have the space here to go into any detail of what our interviews uncovered. 
Nevertheless, a few general comments are appropriate. Firstly, there was widespread 
agreement that the first social conference was a success, with six out the eight unions seeing 
them as positive, and the CFTC respondent describing the first conferences as ‘almost 
perfect’. From 2014, though, only state actors and the main reformist unions, the CFTC and 
CFDT, continued to view them positively. For the radical unions (FSU, Solidaires, FO, 
CGT), the problem was the context of a change of government and hardening of government 
policy to focus on deficit and debt reduction rather than Hollande’s electoral promise to make 
finance pay for the crisis. The rise of what was seen as an austerity-focused, neo-liberal 
current within the Socialist Party was epitomised by the replacement of Jean-Marc Ayrault as 
Prime Minister by Manuel Valls in 2014. The latter was also seen by these unions as far less 
open to social dialogue than his predecessor, an attitude that contributed to the souring of 
relations with a part of the trade union movement.  
 
As a result, the radical unions walked out of the 2014 conference, and the CGT and Solidaires 
boycotted the 2015 conference. Our interview respondents from these organisations 
essentially claimed that this was because the whole process was ‘a sham’ and that the 
government was using the social conferences to gain legitimacy for pre-determined policies 
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that favoured employers, by suggesting there was a consensus over them, with the support of 
the reformist unions.  
 
For others, however, this support from reformist unions was not problematic. For one of the 
state actors interviewed, ‘Consensus does not mean unanimity’, while for our CFDT 
respondent, the radical unions marginalised themselves by their refusal to enter into dialogue 
with the government over reform. Indeed, for this interviewee, dialogue enabled unions to 
make gains in negotiating with the government, exchanging greater labour market flexibility 
for improvements in employee rights. In this outlook, the state used the social conferences to 
get the social partners to share responsibility for reform, and this gave the unions leverage to 
push for gains such as the CPA and generalised company health cover. For both state actors 
and reformist unions, the legitimacy of this approach was reinforced by the results of 
workplace elections, which meant that agreements arising out of the social conferences were 
signed by a coalition of (reformist) unions that could claim to represent a majority of 
employees. It should also be noted that, despite their opposition to the government and the 
social conferences, the CGT and FO did sign national agreements on ‘generation contracts’ - 
which gave state aid for the employment of the young unemployed while maintaining older 
workers in post to pass on their knowledge -, gender equality in the public sector and 
employment security contracts. In general, however, support for agreements and legislation 
came from the reformist unions, with the CGT and FO opposing them (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Nevertheless, there was general agreement that the social conferences were state-dominated. 
While for the radical unions this meant a lack of influence, state actors and reformist unions 
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saw this in more nuanced terms. Prior discussion over the agenda and themes for discussion 
of the social conferences meant that social partners could bring up their concerns, although 
the general framework of discussion reflected government priorities. Likewise, the roadmap 
was seen as a government, not a jointly agreed, document. It was largely prepared in advance 
and minor amendments made in the night following the end of the social conference to reflect 
discussion, with a work programme set out requiring legislation and/or collective bargaining. 
For the reformist unions then, this exercise in social dialogue complements political 
democracy: the social partners can exert influence to amend and improve on the general 
political orientation of a democratically elected government through social compromise. For 
the radical unions, on the other hand, the government divides the union movement, and 
weakens opposition to policies for which it was never elected.  
 
While prior discussion allowed for some union input, the government’s setting of the general 
thematic priorities and control of the roadmap suggests that the government was able to frame 
discussion through control of the agenda. Indeed, one of our state actor respondents admitted 
that ‘The roadmap was drawn up by the government. It was largely drawn up beforehand’. 
On the other hand, the radical union representatoives complained that the government refused 
to discuss the general austerity-focused orientation of macroeconomic policy in the social 
conferences. This, in part at least, is due to the fact thtat as Eurozone member, French 
macroeconomic policy is constrained by centralized euro-area economic governance, 
particularly through the European Semester. 
 
Articulation with the European Level 
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For our interview respondents, any articulation between the European and national levels of 
social dialogue was very weak due to the institutional complexities involved in elaborating a 
clear, coherent message to be uploaded. Some recognised consultation on NRPs, but felt this 
is of little value as social policy remains an area of national competency, and finding a 
common position on EU questions in the CESE, where these questions are dealt with by the 
social partners alongside other civil society actors, is problematic. National positions are then 
filtered by the French government for negotiation with 27 other member states. The French 
unions therefore felt they had no influence and geared their action towards the national level, 
with EU affairs left to EU-level social partners. Input was felt to be more consequent where 
EU matters were dealt with in national law, for example provisions on the use of posted 
workers, which featured in the 2016 Labour Law.  
 
The same weak articulation was also expressed for the downloading of concerns, although 
some recognised that the CSRs formed part of the ideational context within which policy 
debate took place (CFTC, MEDEF, CFDT, UNSA). Again, the radical unions were more 
likely to see the EU as imposing constraints, through austerity, on action and debate at the 
national level. We therefore now turn to an examination of the French CSRs and their 
relationship to social conferences in France. The annual recommendations given to France 
are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Several observations can be made from Table 3. The first is that the European Semester has 
intensified and made explicit the spillover from macroeconomic governance to social policy 
at the EU level. Indeed, as Clauwaert (2016: 11) has shown, the majority of CSRs for France 
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can be categorised as ‘social’ CSRs. Secondly, although not legally binding, the CSRs set out 
a consistent framework for economic and social policy. The accent is on debt and deficit 
reduction, to be achieved through liberalising trades; reducing costs, including tax and social 
insurance contributions, for business; reforming and reducing the cost of social protection 
and pensions; reducing labour market rigidities; and improving the labour supply through 
training and education. 
 
There is, thus, considerable overlap with the themes of the social conferences. The action 
taken under the theme of employment (see Table 1) corresponds to the supply-side 
recommendations of the European Commission and European Council, as do reforms of 
education and training. Under pensions and social protection, there has been a notable reform 
of pensions, in 2014, which aligns closely to the more precise CSRs given in 2013 on this 
topic. Public sector modernisation has also, since 2013 and CSRs on the subject, sought to 
simplify bureaucratic procedures for companies. Finally, the Rebsamen Law of 2015 
responds to the EU’s 2014 invocation to consider the impact of size-thresholds for company 
regulation through its reform of company-level representation structures (for details see 
Kessler 2016). 
 
Thus, the CSRs appear to provide a template for government action at the national level. At 
times, however, it could be argued that the CSRs merely provide ex-post support for 
government action. This can be seen particularly in training policy, where the 2014 law on 
job security introduced the Individual Training Account, in line with CSRs dating back to 
2011 to improve access to lifelong learning. However, this was a feature of Hollande’s 2012 
presidential campaign and was informed by union ideas of ‘making employment pathways 
secure’ dating back to the mid-1990s (Milner 2012: 225-8). Likewise, the Tax Credit for 
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Competitiveness and Employment (CICE), eventually introduced in 2014, reduces social 
security charges for employers, although this was already in train before the 2013 CSR on the 
subject. Finally, according to one state actor, the inspiration for company-level collective 
agreements designed to maintain employment in companies facing financial difficulty 
through changes in wages and working time (and which was taken up in the 2016 Labour 
Law) came, not from the CSRs, but from the pacts for employment and competitiveness 
signed in German companies. 
 
In other areas, however, government policy has clearly changed to align to the CSRs. Thus, 
in his election campaign in 2012 Hollande promised to undo the pension reforms carried out 
under Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency that had raised the retirement age from 60 to 62. The 
2014 reform, however, left the legal retirement age at 62 and increased contributions and 
contribution periods for most workers, effectively raising the retirement age. Likewise, the 
2015 Macron Law, named after the then Minister for the Economy, contained many 
liberalising trends (see below), in line with the 2014 CSR on the subject. In terms of the 
gerneal focus of government policy, Hollande campaigned against the Fiscal Compact and 
the generally neoliberal and austerity focus of Eurozone economic governance, arguing for 
more redistributive tax and spend policies. However, from 2014 onwards, government policy 
focused on liberalisation, deregulation, labour market flexibility and a reduction in state 
spending in order to stimulate growth (McDaniel  2014), promoting what were, for the 
unions, the very austerity policies he had campaigned agianst. In this respect, it could be 
argued that government policy changed to align with the injunctions arising form the 
European Semester and that the first CSR, which always concerns budgets and deficits, is the 
most important one, conditioning the others, as it is the only one that is backed up by the 
threat of hard sanctions, in the form of the excessive deficit procedure, in the case of non-
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compliance (Crespy and Menz 2015).  This change of orientation in policymaking did not 
find favour with the more radical uinions, and nor was it always openly discussed in the 
social conferences, sparking, at times violent, protest on the streets of France. 
 
Conflict and Protest 
 
Indeed, in some areas, policy alignment with the CSRs conspicuously failed to generate 
consensus, and this generally occurred when issues were not raised in the social conferences. 
Thus, the National Pact for Growth, Investment and Productivity (the ‘Responsibility Pact’) 
reduces social charges for employers in exchange for job creation measures through the 
CICE. Although mentioned in the roadmap of the 2014 conference, it was not explicitly dealt 
with in the conferences. FO and the CGT did not sign the Pact and our interviewees from 
those organisations claimed a lack of consultation on the policy. Their organisations 
organised two days of national protest against it in 2014 (see Table 3). 
 
Even more contentiously, the 2011 and 2014 CSRs on employment protection were 
subsequently reflected in the Law for Economic Growth and Activity of 2015, better known 
as the Macron Law, and the Labour Law of 2016, also known as the El Khomri Law after the 
then Minister of Labour. While some of the dispositions of these laws were the subject of 
discussion in the social conferences (restrictions on the use of posted workers in the case of 
the Macron Law and the CPA in the case of the Labour Law), many of their most 
controversial elements were not mentioned in any of the agendas or reports of the 
conferences. According to our interview respondents, this was because the issues were ‘too 
conflictual’ to be dealt with in that forum. 
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The Macron Law of 2015 liberalises many areas of economic activity, such as Sunday 
trading, the legal professions and bus operation. In line with CSRs of 2011 and 2014, it also 
made it more attractive for employers to sign agreements to maintain employment, by 
increasing their maximum period of application from two to five years. During this time, 
employers agree to maintain employment levels in return for changes in work organisation, 
including reduced wages and increased working time. Any employee refusing such changes 
may be dismissed without any alternative employment offered. In line with the 2014 CSR to 
combat labour market rigidity, the 2016 Labour Law notably rendered economic 
redundancies easier and made it easier to increase working time through company-level 
collective agreements (for details see Kessler 2016). In the face of stiff opposition, the law 
was finally passed in the French National Assembly on 21 July 2016 when the government 
for the third time, following two previous readings, resorted to Article 49.3, a legislative 
device that enables the executive to push legislation through parliament without a vote. 
 
Both the Macron and Labour Laws gave rise to protest. As the Macron Law was being 
debated in parliament on 26 January 2015, the CGT, FO, FSU and Solidaires called for 
protests in Paris other French cities, with further protests occurring on 12 May and 24 June. 
The main focus of discontent was the law’s provisions for extending Sunday opening for 
shops. The most vociferous, and at times violent, protest, however, was reserved for the 
Labour Law. Indeed, the radical unions – the CGT, FO FSU and Solidaires - organised 
sustained opposition to the law in conjunction with student movements. Between 3 March 
and 14 June, twelve national days of demonstration took place with two – on 31 March and 
14 June –, according to the organisers, seeing over one million people protesting in the streets 
across France (the police put the figures much lower at 390,00 and 125,000 respectively). 
Although demonstrations continued until 15 September, their scale was subsequently much 
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reduced (Durand 2016). The main focus of anger was the proposal to allow for more flexible 
working time and reduced overtime payments through local agreements that could derogate 
from higher level, industry, agreements. These pieces of legislation were not discussed in 
Hollande’s social conferences, and union leaders complained of a lack of consultation, 
particularly over the Labour Law, a feeling reflected in our interviews. Even the respondent 
of the CFDT, which did not take part in the protests, described consultation over the Labour 
Law as ‘brief’. 
 
More widely, however, the general trend in the decade from 2005 to 2014 was towards a 
reduction in strikes, particularly from 2011 onwards. The period from 2005-2009 saw an 
average of 129 individual workdays lost per thousand employees, compared to 74 from 2011-
2014 (Ministère du Travail 2015: 645). However, after two years of relative peace, when only 
two national protest movements took place, the period from 2012 also saw more national-
level ‘days of action’ called by trade unions (two of the four in 2012 were of EU origin rather 
than national – see Table 4). 2015 and 2016 saw days of action in protest at the passage of the 
Macron and Labour Laws, as noted above, with 2016, in particular outdoing the recent high 
point of the 2010 protests against Sarkozy’s pension reform. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
What is noticeable is that within six months of the first social conference in July 2012, one of 
the themes addressed and which would lead to a national level collective agreement and 
legislation – that of employment security – had already led to a national mobilisation on the 
part of the unions.  The CFDT and UNSA appeared satisfied with subsequent discussion, but 
the radical unions continued with three further days of action on and following the day of the 
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signing of the agreement on 11 January 2013. In general, however, protest was reserved for 
those issues not debated in the social conferences and where the radical unions, at least, 
complained of a lack of consultation: the ‘Responsibility Pact’ in 2014 and the  
Macron and Labour Laws in 2015 and 2016 respectively.  
 
Conclusion 
In replicating EU institutions and processes at the national level, France appeared to be 
ideally placed to implement EU ambitions for a reinvigorated social dialogue and, indeed, 
with the election of François Hollande in 2012, seemed, on the surface, to be pre-empting 
such ambitions. However, what the President presented as the central ‘method’ of his 
stewardship soon unravelled. From this overview of the social conferences held between 
2012 and 2015, several observations can be made. 
Firstly, tensions rose from 2014 with a refocusing of government strategy, meaning that 
consensus over policy could only be reached with the reformist unions. The radical unions, 
rather than seeing their own policy orientations shaped through processes of social dialogue, 
on the other hand, fell back on oppositional action and rhetoric, as they believed they could 
not influence debates and outcomes that were framed by the neoliberal outlook of 
policymakers who controlled the agenda of the social conferences. In effect, the social 
conferences failed to increase trust by socialising the radical unions into a policymaking 
process based upon rational deliberation to achieve consensus. This was, however, possible 
with the reformsit unions. This strongly suggests that European Commission plans to 
reinforce the social dialogue through increasing the input of the social partners into the 
European Semester risk coming to nothing in those countries where there is not already a 
culture of social compromise and strong, centralised reformist trade unions able and willing 
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to enter into compromises in an attempt to promote economic competitiveness and 
employment. Indeed, the French case suggests that rather than social dialogue functioning to 
elicit consensus, some pre-existing consensus, in the sense of shared cognitive frameworks, 
needs to be in place for it to function. Without this, the result is conflict over the framing of 
issues and the consequent action required. 
Even where cognirtive frameworks do not differ as radically as they do in the French case, 
however, the promotion of social dialogue may not be sufficient to reverse the tide of 
growing Euroscepticism as hoped by the EC. In terms of the multi-level governance 
framework and spillover, the interaction between national-level social dialogue and EU-level 
policymaking remained extremely weak despite institutional innovation that appeared to 
reflect EU ambitions. While insititutional complexities constrain the possibility of uploading 
from the national to the EU level for the unions, the European governance architecture itself 
provides a constraint on social dialogue at the national level. The CSRs provided, at the very 
least,  through processes of vertical and horizontal spillover, a normative frame for 
government policy that strongly encouraged deregulation and liberalisation as well as cuts in 
social spending, thereby reducing he margin for manoeuvre for union-friendly deals to be 
struck and the possibility of consensus. Without a change in focus of macroeconomic 
governance at the EU-level, the prospects for greater national level social partner input into 
the construction of a more social Europe, or even into domestic policymaking, do not, 
therefore, seem propitious. This should be of concern at a point in time when it is more 
needed than ever due to the informal encroachment of EU competence into the area of social 
and labour market policy through processes associated with the European Semester.  
Of course, France could be seen as just a deviant case, and further comparative research is 
needed to see whether Junker’s call for an improved social dialogue is being met in other 
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countries, what the necessary conditions for this are, and what the results of this may be. On 
the other hand, France may serve as a critical case study, and as a warning for other countries 
that some form of dialogue, however imperfect, is better than none at all. It is noticeable that 
the most vociferous, and at times violent, opposition to government reforms was reserved for 
those pieces of legislation that were not discussed in the social conferences. In this sense, the 
function of social dialogue may not be to elicit consensus, but to legitimise policymaking 
through open discussion, thereby dampening conflict through an acceptance of the rules of 
the game. In our interviews, the FO respondent, even though vehemently opposed to 
government policy, accepted the government’s democratic right to legislate. What was not 
accepted was that such legislation is passed with little or no discussion with stakeholders. 
A further warning, for both other countries and the EU, comes from developments in France 
at the time of writing. Following his election in 2017, President Macron abandoned the social 
conferences in favour of a ‘vertical’ exercise of power. As a result, from November 2018 
through to the time of writing in February 2019, France witnessed protests against 
government policies every weekend in Paris and other towns and cities as the ‘gilets jaunes’ 
took to the streets in hi-vis jackets that gave the name to their movement, complaining that 
their voices were not being heard (Boutin and Landier 2019). As suggested above, while 
social dialogue may not lead to consensus, it may provide a channel for such opposition to at 
least be discussed, thereby avoiding the violence and chaos witnessed on a regular basis in 
present-day France. In instituting a ‘great national debate’ in response to the protests, Macron 
has accepted that some form of dialogue is preferable to unchannelled protest from the 
marginalised. 
 
Notes 
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1. The organisations that participated in this study are the radical left unions: Confédération 
générale du travail (CGT),  Force Ouvrière (FO), Fédération des syndicats unifiée 
(FSU), Union syndicale solidaire (USS) also known as Solidaires; reformist unions: 
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT), Confédération française des 
travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC), Union nationale des syndicats autonomes (UNSA); and 
employer organisations: Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF) and Union des 
entreprises de proximité (U2P).  
2. To engage in national collective bargaining, the 2008 Law on Trade Union 
Representativeness stipulated that unions must have at least eight per cent of the votes 
cast in professional elections. In 2013, five organisations achieved this and were therefore 
deemed to be nationally representative, with the so-called reformist unions – the CFDT, 
CFTC and CFE-CGC – having a 51%-49% majority over the so-called radical unions, the 
CGT and FO (Ministère du travail 2013). Unions not achieving this threshold were, on 
the radical side, the FSU and Solidaires, and on the reformist side, UNSA. 
3. Such fora include national committees on issues such as collective bargaining, 
employment and training, pensions and the bipartite management of social security funds. 
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1 The terms ‘reformist’ and ‘radical’ are refused by the so-called radical unions, who argue that they also make positive 
proposals. They are used here, however, as a form of shorthand as the radical unions are generally left-leaning and oppose 
the general direction of government policy as being too favourable to employers due to its focus on competitiveness and 
austerity.  
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2 Such fora include national committees on issues such as collective bargaining, employment and training, pensions etc. To a 
long list could be added the bipartite management of social security funds, but these are not considered here as they 
generally deal with the technical aspects of social security financing and funding. 
